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Another big group of dolphins had just surfaced alongside our moving vessel — 
leaping and splashing and calling mysteriously back and forth in their squeally, 
whistly way, with many babies swift alongside their mothers. And this time, 
confined to just the surface of such deep and lovely lives, I was becoming 
unsatisfied. I wanted to know what they were experiencing, and why to us they feel 
so compelling, and so — close. This time I allowed myself to ask them the question 
that was forbidden fruit: Who are you?  
 
Science usually steers firmly from questions about the inner lives of animals. Surely 
they have inner lives of some sort. But a young scientist is taught that the animal 
mind is unknowable. Permissible questions are “it” questions: where it lives; what it 
eats; what it does when danger threatens; how it breeds. Always forbidden is the 
one question that might open the door: “Who?”  
 
 
There are good reasons to avoid so fraught an inquiry. But the reason we least 
acknowledge is that the barrier between humans and animals is artificial, because 
humans are animals. 
 
In our estrangement from nature we have severed our sense of the community of 
life and lost touch with this perspective. And when the science of animal behavior 
was getting established, there was no scientific way to approach the prospect of 
animal emotions, or even to pose a question such as “What does an elephant feel 
when she nurses her baby?” There was nothing to go on.  No one had watched free-
living animals living their real lives. Brain science was in its infancy. So speculation 
about their feelings could only draw on our own feelings — leading ourselves in 
circles. The new scientists insisted on observation, not speculation. Speculation was 
messy guessing that one had to avoid. We can observe what an elephant does. 
There’s no way to know how the animal feels. So just count how many minutes she 
nurses her offspring for.  
 
My own initiation into formal training included the classic directive to steer strictly 
clear of anything smacking of attributing human mental experiences — values, 
thoughts, or emotions — to other animals. (Doing so is called “anthropomorphism.”) 
I appreciate that. We shouldn’t assume that animals (or, for that matter, lovers, 
spouses, kids, or parents) “must be” thinking and feeling just as we would if we were 
them. They’re not us. By not assuming, we open a clearer path to understanding 
what’s really going on.  
 
But it wasn’t that the question of animal thoughts and emotions awaited better data; 
it was that the whole subject became verboten. Wondering what feelings or 
thoughts might motivate behavioral acts became taboo. Description — and only 
description — became “the” science of animal behavior. You could say that a lion 
was stalking a zebra. If you said the lion wanted to catch it, you’d be accused of 
“projecting your human emotions.” After all, the lion might be an utterly 
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unconscious machine — you can’t know. You could say, “The elephant positioned 
herself between her calf and the hyena.” She knows hyenas are a threat. She 
wouldn’t position herself between her baby and an antelope. But if you said, “The 
mother positioned herself to protect her baby from the hyena,” that was out of 
bounds; it was anthropomorphic. We can’t know the mother’s intent. And this was 
stifling.  
 
In establishing the study of behavior as a science, it had originally been helpful to 
make “anthropomorphism” a word that raised a red flag. But as lesser intellects 
followed the Nobel Prize–winning pioneers, “anthropomorphism” became a pirate 
flag. If the word was hoisted, an attack was imminent. You wouldn’t get your work 
published. And in the academic realm of publish or perish, jobs were at stake. Even 
the most informed, insightful, logical inferences about other animals’ motivations, 
emotions, and awareness could wreck your professional prospects. 
 
Not assuming other animals had thoughts and feelings was good science. Insisting 
they did not was bad science. By banning what was considered anthropomorphic, 
the behaviorists perpetuated the opposite error. They institutionalized the all-too-
human notion that only humans are conscious and can feel anything. Certainly, 
projecting feelings onto other animals can lead to us misunderstanding their 
motivations. But denying that they had any motivation guaranteed 
misunderstanding it. Denying the possibility that any other animals have any 
thoughts and feelings reinforces what we all most want to hear: We are special. 
Utterly different. Better. Best. (Talk about projecting!) 
 
Peculiarly, many behaviorists — who are biologists — chose to overlook the core 
process of biology: Evolution. Each newer thing is a slight tweak on something older. 
Everything humans do and possess came from somewhere. Before humans could be 
assembled, evolution needed to have most of the parts in stock, and those parts 
were developed for earlier models. We inherited them. Witness, for instance, the 
journey of jointed legs: A frog’s upper rear leg-bone is a femur, no less than in a 
chicken, as in a child. Thus we trace transformation from amphibian to flying bird to 
triathlete. A creature that sleeps is sleeping, species notwithstanding. One that 
sneezes is sneezing. Species differ — but are often not very different. Our brain’s 
provenance is inseparable from other species’ brains in the long cauldron of living 
time. And thus, so is our mind. Our mind arrived with other species’ minds in the 
continuous sweep of Life. 
 
When someone says you can’t attribute human emotions to animals, they forget the 
key leveling detail: humans are animals. Human sensations are animal sensations: 
inherited sensations, using inherited nervous systems. Simply deciding that other 
animals can’t have any emotions that humans feel is a cheap way to get a monopoly 
on all the world’s feelings and motivation. Human emotions of pleasure, pain, 
sexuality, hunger, frustration, self-preservation, defense, parental protection — we 
see evidence of all these in other species. 
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We never seem to doubt that an animal acting hungry feels hungry. We can’t really 
claim scientific objectivity when we recognize hunger and thirst while animals are 
eating and drinking, and exhaustion when they tire, but we deny them joy and 
happiness as they’re playing with their children and their families. Yet the science of 
animal behavior has long operated with that bias — and that’s unscientific.  
 
When animals seem joyous in joyful contexts, joy is the simplest interpretation of 
the evidence. Their brains are similar to ours, they make the same hormones 
involved in human emotions — and that’s evidence too. In science, the simplest 
interpretation of evidence is often the best. 
 
If an animal comes to lick you and lie next to you, you assume it “loves” you. And I 
think that’s a pretty reasonable conclusion, especially considering the enormous 
range of emotions that we label with the word “love.” Romantic love, parental love, 
infantile love, love of community, of country, love of food, of chocolate, love of books 
and education, of sports, the arts. . . .The word “love” is a catchall phrase for so many 
different positive emotions. If an elephant sees her sister and calls to maintain 
contact, or a parrot sees his mate and wants to be nearer, some feeling of the bond 
makes it seek closeness. One word we use for the feeling behind our desire for 
closeness is “love.” Elephants and birds don’t feel their love for one another the way 
I feel my love, but the same is true of my own friends, my mother, my wife, my 
stepdaughter, and my next-door neighbors. Love isn’t one thing, and human love 
isn’t all identical in quality or intensity. But I believe that the word that labels ours 
also labels theirs. 
 
When a dog is scratching the door, a person steeped in fear of anthropomorphism 
would insist that we cannot know whether the dog “wants” to go out. (Meanwhile, of 
course, your dog is thinking, “Let me out; I don’t want to pee in the house.”) 
Obviously, the dog wants to go out. And if you insist on ignoring the evidence, have a 
mop handy. 
 
All the evidence indicates widespread consciousness — the experience of sensations 
— throughout most of the animal kingdom. So the interesting question now is, 
“What is consciousness like for other animals?”  
 
I can almost hear some people say, “Not so fast.” How do I really know that other 
animals think and feel? I know because when my dog gets up from the rug and 
comes to me and rolls onto her back to expose her belly, she shows that she has 
anticipated the pleasure of having her belly rubbed, and knows that I will 
understand her request and that I can oblige. She has thought, and she has felt. 
Simple, really, as that. 
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